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By historical standards, the 1980's have been a time of high unemployment in
West Germany. Not surprisingly, they have also been a boom period for
theories about unemployment and policy proposals against it. This paper is an
attempt in stocktaking: We shall try to sort out which of the most prominent
of these theories and policy proposals are still relevant today at the end of
the decade, with the West German economy having somewhat recovered from
its prior growth slack, but unemployment nevertheless remaining a persistent
macroeconomic phenomenon. Of course, the survey-like nature of the paper
prohibits any extensive discussion of theoretical subtleties and any detailed
presentation of econometric evidence. Instead, it must suffice to sketch the
main threads of arguments and to identify major characteristic features of the
empirical picture.
Our survey consists of three parts. In section II of the paper, we shall
summarize some important macroeconomic facts about West German
unemployment in the eighties. In section III, we shall briefly evaluate some
major theories of unemployment with a view to their explanatory power for
present-day West Germany. In the final section IV, we shall discuss various
policy measures which have been proposed as a cure to the unemployment
malaise.
II. Some Stylized Macroeconomic Facts
Figure 1 presents the average annual unemployment rate in West Germany
from mid' 1948 - the time of the currency reform - up to the present. The
picture suggests a division into five periods: after a sharp increase in
1948-50, the rate declined almost continuously all over the fifties, from a peak
above 10 % in 1950 down to almost 1 % in 1960. The sixties and the early
seventies were a period of very tight labour market conditions with an
unemployment rate around 1 %; only the short recession of 1967 led to a
temporary upsurge to just over 2 %. Around 1973/75, the picture shifts quite
dramatically: within two years, the unemployment rate rose to about 4 % and
then stayed there, with the number of unemployed stagnating at the 1 Mio.
threshold level. At the beginning of the eighties, a second upward shift
occured, with a subsequent unemployment rate of .8-9 % and a jobless labour
force of about 2. 2 Mio. people. Clearly, this pattern points to two structuralFigure 1
























(a) For 1948 only second half of the year; for 1948-59 excluding the Saar and Berlin.
Source: Until 1952, Bundesminister fur Arbeit, Labour Statistics; from 1953, Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit,
Labour Statistics.- 3 -
Table 1: Unemployment Rates of G7-Countries for Selected Years (in %)
1983 1988
(a) (b) (a) (b)
West Germany 9.1 8.0 8.7 6.2
France 8.4 8.3 10.1 10.1
Italy 9.2 9.3 11.0 11.8
UK 11.2 12.4 8.2 8.3
USA 9.6 9.5 5.5 5.4
Canada 11.8 11.8 7.8 7.7
Japan 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5
EEC-average 10.5 10.5 10.2 10.0
(a) unemployment rate according to national sources (annual
average)
(b) standardized unemployment rate according to OECD (annual
average)
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 45, June 1989, pp. 188-189 and Bundesanstalt
fur Arbeit, Arbeitsstatistik 1988 - Jahreszahlen, pp. 8-9.
breaks in the labour market record of the last fifteen years, one in 1973/75
with a rise of the unemployment rate from 1 to 4 % and one in 1981/83 with a
rise from 4 to 9 %. Note that, by international standards, it is not before
1981/83 that West Germany qualifies as a country with a genuine mass
unemployment problem. Prima facie, this supports the popular view that, after
all, the culprit must be found in the economic environment and policies of the
eighties, not of prior periods.
As to the labour market of the eighties, the impression conveyed by Figure 1
may be misleading in two respects. Firstly, for a number of technical
reasons, West German unemployment statistics tend to overstate the jobless
rate, at least by commonly used OECD-standards. This is shown in Table 1
which juxtaposes the unemployment rates of the G7-countries in 1983 and
1988, measured according to (a) the respective national definitions and (b)
OECD-standardization. The message is unambigious: only in West Germany
The difference between the numbers (a) and (b.) in Table 1 is mostly due
to the fact that, to measure unemployment, some national statistics use the
officially registered number of unemployed persons while others (and the
OECD) use census data on labour force status. In the case of West
Germany, the difference is particularly large for two reasons: (i) The
contin. footnote- 4 -
does the 'national rate' significantly surpass the 'OECD-rate' in both years.
Thus, compared to other countries, the labour market performance in West
Germany looks much better on a standardized basis. Still more important is
the fact that the West German 'national rate' has virtually stagnated around 9
% between 1983 and 1988, whereas the 'OECD-rate' has been reduced from 8 %
in 1983 to 6.2 % in 1988 (and, on a seasonally adjusted basis, to 5. 6 % in May
1989). It follows that, according to the OECD-figures, West Germany now
takes the third rank in the G7-country-league, far behind Japan, but fairly
close to the United States and well ahead of the EEC-partners and the EEC as
a whole. Hence, whatever the merits and shortcomings of any particular
definition of the unemployment rate, it is indisputable that West Germany in
the late 1980's has much less of a labour surplus than the other major
EEC-countries.
Secondly, the more fundamental question arises whether unemployment is an
adequate measure of the labour market performance in different periods.
Clearly, this depends on the definition of performance: if one strictly means
the ability of an economy to provide its labour force with jobs, then the
unemployment rate is in fact the relevant criterion. However, for many
purposes of comparative evaluation in an environment with persistent surplus
labour, the development of labour demand justly receives somewhat more
weight than labour supply; after all it makes quite a difference for economic
policy whether an increase of the unemployment rate is mainly due to a slow-
down of employment growth or to an accelerated increase of the labour force.
In the former case, the economy has increasingly failed to meet a fixed
target; in the latter case, it has 'only' failed to keep pace with an upward-
moving target.
contin. footnote
'national' rate is defined as the share of unemployed in the labour force
excluding self-employed, the OECD-rate as the share of unemployed in the
total labour force (incl. self-employed); (ii) the number of unemployed
persons is calculated on basis of the officially registered unemployment,
with an exceptionally generous definition of the relevant criteria 'available
for work' and 'actively searching for work'. Thereby, the growth of the
gap between (a) and (b) for West Germany from 1.1 to 2.5 percentage
points (from 1983 to 1988) can be explained by a change of census
methodology: until 1983, the OECD used data of the West German census,
after 1983 of an EEC-wide census which is somewhat more restrictive as to
the definition of unemployment. For details, see Klos (1989).- 5 -
Table 2: Average Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP, the Labour Force and







Dependent Status Employment (a)
- total
- private sector*











- Private non-profit org.
Notes: * Excluding private non-profit organizations
(a) Employment statistics of national accounts
(b) Employment statistics of social security administration
Source: Own calculations from National Accounts Statistics and Employment
Statistics of social security administration (Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit)
Table 2 shows that this distinction is important for the question at hand: in
West Germany, the labour force grew faster in the eighties than in the two
prior periods, mainly because the changing age structure of the population
led to a rising participation ratio. Note that if one restricts the periods to
two recovery years after major cyclical troughs (1976-80 and 1983-88) the
rates are almost equalized since (i) foreign labour was heavily used as a
pro-cyclical buffer stock in the labour market in the recession 1974/75, but
much less so in 1981/82, and (ii) the rise of the participation ratio already
began right in the second half of the seventies. Looking at employment
growth as a whole (including self-employed), the message of Figure 1 is al-
most put upside down: while employment still grew in the sixties - mainly
through the guest worker influx - its annual growth rate turned negative






















































































than in 1980-88. If we confine ourselves to the shorter recovery periods, the
growth rates become positive, but the interperiod pattern shifts only
marginally, with the growth in the late seventies now being somewhat faster
than in the eighties. If government employment is excluded, the picture turns
even more favourable for the eighties: private sector employment shrank at a
lower rate in the eighties than in the years 1973-1980 and it grew at about
the same rate in the two recovery periods 1976-80 and 1983-88. If self-
employment is excluded, the seventies fare. better than the eighties, inde-
2
pendent of the measure used , but the gap is much smaller than between the
sixties and the two later periods. If we further take into account that 1989 is
likely to turn out as an exceptionally successful year of job creation with an
employment increase of probably around 350000, then there is certainly no
basis for suspecting a break in trend growth of employment somewhere at the
beginning of the current decade.
This conclusion holds not only for the speed of unemployment growth, but
also for its structural dimension (see again Table 2). The general pattern of
structural change is unambiguous: agriculture and forestry shrank dramatic-
ally in the sixties and seventies, but much less so in the eighties. As this
shrinkage mainly involved a reduction of self-employment, a major reason for
the divergence between employment growth measured including and excluding
self-employed becomes evident: apparently, the labour supply reserve of agri-
culture had been dried up by the late seventies since, in the given institu-
tional framework with heavy subsidization of agriculture, a further rapid
decline was not feasible. In all other major structural respects, the seventies
and eighties look much alike, but quite different from the sixties: industry
grew until 1973, but shrank thereafter, with an average annual rate of -1.3
%. Note that, within industry, manufacturing recovered somewhat faster from
the recession in the eighties than in the seventies whereas construction
boomed in the late seventies, but badly contracted in the eighties; energy
2
Table 2 presents data on dependent status employment of both the national
accounts and the social security statistics. In general, the latter source
points to higher growth rates than the former. Right now, there is a fierce
debate among statisticians in West Germany about which of these data
sources comes closer to the truth, with the result of the 1987 population
census raising serious questions about the reliability of both sources. As
our main conclusions do not depend on the final outcome of this debate, we
can by-pass it at this point. For details, see Wermter, Cramer (1988).- 7 -
and mining continued a moderate decline all throughout, with a temporary
relative improvement in the seventies due to the surge of energy prices.
Private services and government grew in all three periods: services at about
a constant rate of 0.7-1 % p. a. and government at a decreasing rate,
reaching a low of about 0.9 % p. a. in the period 1983-88.
To summarize, most indicators of the employment growth performance of the
seventies since 1973 and the eighties until 1988/89 suggest that the periods
should be treated as one. The only major difference stems from the bottoming
out of structural change away
1 from the primary sector which was still an
important labour supply source in the seventies, but not any more in the
eighties. If one focuses on private sector employment - and this is justified
since government expansion reflects more political preference and necessity
than economic forces - it is hard to recognize any dramatic slow-down of
growth at the beginning of the eighties. Hence, the relatively poor
unemployment record in the 1980's may well have its roots in a slack of
employment growth which goes back deep into the seventies and which is,
after all, a long-term phenomenon.
III. Theories of West German Unemployment
Among the many theories of West German unemployment that have sprouted in
recent years, we shall review five paradigmatic ones which figure as the main
landmarks of the economic policy debate. They are the theories of (1) a
Keynesian demand gap, (2) a neoclassical wage gap, (3) a transatlantic
crowding-out of growth dynamics, (4) a hysteretic labour market and (5)
structural rigidities. Leaving aside any technical details, we shall in the
following evaluate their explanatory power.
1. Keynesian Demand Gap
When assessing the (traditional) Keynesian view that a lack of aggregate
demand is the main explanation of West German unemployment of the 1980's,
Much of our reasoning in Part III of this paper follows the more extensive
treatment in Paque (1989b, c) where the technical details of the relevant
empirical studies are dealt with.- 8 -
one has to distinguish between two alternative meanings of the term
'explanation'.
If explanation means a historical account of the emergence of unemployment,
then the Keynesian view has some appeal. Clearly, a new dimension of
unemployment was reached in the early eighties in the course of a demand
contraction which was the immediate result of deliberate policy shifts of the
West German Bundesbank towards stabilizing the price level and of the
government towards consolidating public finances, both political backlashes
after the prior 'locomotive experiment' of concerted demand expansion in the
late seventies. The relevant macro statistics are broadly consistent with this
4
view, econometric evidence supports it. After all, this is not surprising: the
historical record shows that drastic upward shifts of the unemployment rate
usually occur via a stabilization crisis; in post-war West Germany, this was so
in 1948-50 after the currency reform, but also in 1974-75 and again in
1981-83. Apparently, the intertemporal covariance of sharp demand
contractions and equally sharp increases of unemployment is the statistically
dominant force in the empirical picture so that any econometric attempt at
assigning unemployment to 'causes' tends to support a demand side hypothesis
more than any supply side competitor. Note, in this respect, that the most
widely quoted econometric accounting study (Bruno 1986) assigns at no time
from 1974 to 1982 less than one half of West German unemployment to
aggregate demand causes, despite the pronounced and by now generally re-
cognized wage pressure and the accompanying marked increase of unit labour
costs from 1969 to early 1975, and despite the locomotive experiment of the
late seventies which pushed the capacity utilization of the capital stock to a
peak not reached since 1973 and not reached again until 1988.
If 'explanation' means a genuine diagnosis of unemployment as it is today, the
traditional Keynesian view is hardly compatible with the facts since the
relevant economic indicators show that the West German economy does not
See, e.g., Bruno (1986) who assigns 2/3 of West German unemployment of
1982 to aggregate demand (i. a. monetary and fiscal policy variables) and
only the rest to a wage gap measure.
Similar results for West Germany have been obtained with different econo-
metric techniques i. a. by Layard, Nickell (1985); Layard, Nickell, Jackman
(1985); Franz, Konig (1986), and Gordon (1988).- 9 -
suffer from a general demand slump which involves underemployment of both
capital and labour. By 1989, capacity utilization in industry - how ever
measured - has probably surpassed the prior peak levels of 1979 and 1973,
after six years of steady - albeit moderate - real GDP-growth averaging
about 2. 5 % p. a. which lately accelerated to about 3. 5 % in 1988 and probably
around 4 % in 1989. Whatever slack of demand may have been present at the
beginning of the long upswing around 1982/83 or in the temporary slowdown
of growth around 1984/85, it has definitely disappeared since then. Note that
those econometric studies still pointing to an output gap in recent years
(notably Coen, Hickman, 1988; Gordon, 1988) use data up to 1984 only, a
time when the cyclical indicators in West Germany revealed a slightly below
average, not an extraordinarily high utilization of the capital stock; by now,
their diagnostic messages have simply become obsolete.
In discarding a traditional Keynesian diagnosis, two caveats must be kept in
mind. First, by definition, the capital stock today is the outcome of prior
investments, and when the pace of capital accumulation slows down due to a
demand induced recession as it did in 1981/82, the capital stock in later times
will be smaller and thus more quickly fully utilized than in the absence of the
recession. This means that, historically, Keynesian causes have non-Keynes-
ian consequences; however, as the capital stock inherited from the past is
today a binding supply side constraint, this does not save the traditional
Keynesian diagnosis from being misplaced. It merely introduces an element of
path dependency which, of course, speaks for avoiding recessions in the first
6 See the forecast of the Institut fur Weltwirtschaft (1989), p. 18, Tab. 3.
The 4 % -growth-forecast is hardly controversial among business observers
of the West German economy. As to capacity utilization, there are several
indicators: according to the quarterly industry poll of the Ifo-Institute,
Munich, which is usually regarded as the most reliable source for this kind
of data, capacity utilization in manufacturing reached 88.7 % in the fourth
quarter of 1988, higher than the prior peak levels of 1979 IV (85.5 %) and
1973 II (87.4 %) and only below the 'historical' high of 1970 I (92 %). On a
yearly basis, capacity utilization in 1988 (86.7 %) has been higher than in
1979 (84.7 %) and about as high as in 1973 (87.1 %), but again below 1970
(91.0 %). On basis of (less reliable) capital stock figures and extrapolations
of capital productivity, the Kiel Institute of World Economics and some other
institutions calculate economy-wide annual capacity utilization indices.
Defining the long-term high of 1970 as 100, the Kiel Institute Index reached
98.4 in 1988, slightly below the level of 1979 (99.1) and 1973 (99.2). All
relevant business observers agree that in 1989, capacity utilization is likely
to be even higher.- 10 -
place. Second, the comparatively low rates of price and wage inflation in
present-day West Germany may provoke a traditional Keynesian to argue
that - given some wage and price stickiness in the short run - there remains
enough scope for exploiting a Phillips-curve trade-off between unemployment
and demand induced price inflation; hence West German unemployment would
still be Keynesian in this sense. This argument mistakes the absolute level of
price and wage inflation as a better indicator for the state of the business
cycle than some measure of capacity utilization and output growth. However,
as the West German (and other countries') historical experience shows,
business cycle peaks have at different times been accompanied by vastly
different levels of price inflation, depending on the prior record of price
(in-)stability which forms the basis for economic agents' expectations. If
anything, the acceleration of price inflation may give a clue as to the state of
the business cycle, and this indicator does in fact signal some worsening of
the price climate, with virtual consumer price stability in 1986 being followed
by inflation rates of 0.5 % in 1987, 1.3 % in 1988 and, as most forecasters
g
predict, somewhere around 3 % in 1989 and 3-3.5 % in 1990. Hence, despite
its low level by international standards, West German inflation cannot be
taken as evidence that the economy is still operating far below its capacity
limits, with additional labour being employable at more or less constant
marginal cost at a given capital stock. Yet, with a fully utilized capital stock,
price increases can only serve as (non-anticipated) shocks to reduce the level
of real wages so that, at its lower than average marginal product, additional
labour will be hired. Then, of course, the Phillips-curve strategy would boil
down to a Keynesian cure for a neoclassical malady, namely a level of real
wages not compatible with full employment.
Usually, Keynesian calls for expansionary macro policies in West Germany
are couched in terms of international coordination, with a view to the
notorious West German trade and current account surplus (see, e.g., The
Economist of Feb., 4, 1989, p. 65 "Still waiting for the locomotive"). As far
as these calls are simply meant as a case for international charity in the
sense that West Germany should pull other countries out of a slump
(though, incidentally, a non-visible one), they have nothing to do with
unemployment in West Germany and thus go beyond the scope of this paper.
As far as they are meant to make a case for unemployment reduction in
West Germany itself, their validity crucially depends on the elasticity of
aggregate supply which is dealt with in the text.
8 See, e.g., Institut fur Weltwirtschaft (1989), p. 18, Table 3; RWI-Konjunk-
turberichte (1989), p. 29.- 11 -
2. Neoclassical Wage Gap
The traditional neoclassical diagnosis of West German unemployment states that
the level of unit labour costs is too high for full employment to be achieved.
The only straight way to test this hypothesis comes down to comparing the
current level of real unit labour costs at a hypothetical state of full
employment with a base level at some time in the past when full employment of
labour and capital actually prevailed. The difference between these two levels
- expressed as a share of the base level - is then called a wage gap. Many
serious technical difficulties are involved when calculating a wage gap. In
particular, some crucial parameters of the economy's production technology
must be estimated or imposed beforehand, and the 'neoclassical' inverse
variation of employment and labour productivity has to be econometrically
seperated from the 'Keynesian' procyclical movements of productivity due to
9
labour hoarding in recessions and dishoarding in booms.
How ever these technical problems are tackled, the most recent wage gap
estimates for West Germany give a quite uniform picture for the manufacturing
sector , they indicate substantial wage gaps around 20 % in the 1980's, with
only a very recent trend downwards. Of course, manufacturing has a share
of no more than 35 % of total employment in West Germany so that a
manufacturing wage gap may tell a partial and distorted story for the economy
as a whole. Estimates for the entire West German economy point to much
smaller gaps since the mid-seventies peaking at around 10 % in the early
eighties and then falling to levels around 7 % in 1986 and - as a first guess -
around 5-6 % in 1988/89. Also, intertemporal patterns are remarkable: while
the wage gap in manufacturing grew into a new dimension in the second half
of the seventies, it leveled off in the economy as a whole, with only a very
modest increase from the mid-seventies to the early eighties. Table 3 gives a
9 See Artus (1984), pp. 256-261, Bruno, Sachs (1985), pp. 179-183, and
Paque (1989b), pp. 13-18 for the relevant details.
1 See, above all, Burda, Sachs (1987) and Paque (1989b). Using data up to
1984, Gordon (1988) finds no wage gaps at all for the West German economy
in the early eighties; however, his methodology has serious shortcomings
which make his estimates look quite suspect. For a critique of Gordon
(1988), see Vaubel (1989).
See Paque (1989b, c). Technical details are discussed in Paque (1989b).- 12 -
clue to the structural forces behind this well-confirmed empirical picture: in
the early seventies, both manufacturing and services were hit by a hefty rise
of nominal labour costs which was mainly due to an increase of the wage
level. Yet, all over the seventies, the service sector could significantly
improve its terms-of-trade relative to manufacturing, so that, by the middle
of the decade, real unit labour costs in services began to decline again while
employment continued to grow. Not so in manufacturing, where it took two
recessions with a net loss of almost two million jobs to achieve the required
cost adjustment by the mid' 1980's. Apparently, import competition from newly
industrialized countries finally squeezed the manufacturing sector down to a
competitive size with a better product mix to halt a further deterioration of
its terms-of-trade relative to the service sector. In fact, in the 1980s,
manufacturing even managed to realize a slight intersectoral terms-of-trade
gain which translated into a marked reduction of real unit labour costs.
Given this distinct pattern of structural change between two major sectors of
the West German economy, it would be misleading to infer from a large
manufacturing wage gap that the level of unit labour costs is on average 'too
12 high' in the economy as a whole. As the relatively small wage gap for the
total economy indicates, a good part of the manufacturing wage gap is likely
to be due to intersectoral terms-of-trade effects. By themselves, these effects
raise important issues of intersectoral wage rigidity to which we turn later in
this paper. Nevertheless, they speak against the simple neoclassical wage
level diagnosis.
To save the traditional macro-version of the neoclassical approach from ob-
solescence, some non-Keynesian macro reason must be found why about the
same level of average unit labour cost means lower employment in the
eighties than in the wage gap reference period, usually the late sixties.
Just this is the core of the transatlantic crowding-out hypothesis.
12






















Table 3 - Average Annual Growth Rate of Value Added Deflator,
Nominal and Real Unit Labour Costs in West Germany (in %)
1969-74
a) Value Added Deflator
- all sectors +7.2
- manufacturing +6.0
- services +8.0
b) Nominal Unit Labour Cost
- all sectors +8.5
- manufacturing +8.1
- services +8.9
c) Real Unit Labour Cost




incl. trade and transportation
Source: Own calculations from National Accounts Statistics.
3. Transatlantic Crowding -out
Fitoussi, Phelps (1988) have advanced the theory that it was the peculiar
policy mix of the early Reaganomics which caused the European - and thus
also the West German - unemployment malaise in the eighties, despite the
downward correction of real unit labour costs. Briefly summarized, their
argument runs as follows: after the tax reform act of 1981, the sharp rise of
the U. S. -budget deficit led to an increase of real interest rates, a high
current account deficit and - temporarily - to a drastic appreciation of the
U.S.-dollar. As U.S.-firms were heavily favoured by the newly implemented
tax cuts and investment subsidies, they did not face a rise in capital costs
despite the increase of real interest rates. In Europe, however, high real
interest rates did raise capital costs while the appreciation of the US-dollar
reduced the pressure of competition; both effects pushed firms into increasing
their mark-up over unit labour cost. Hence, despite the actual fall of real
unit labour cost, employment contracted or at least stagnated.
Whatever the merits of this reasoning as a theoretical account of some
macroeconomic disequilibria, it has diagnostic shortcomings for present-day
unemployment in West Germany. This is so for three reasons. Firstly, as an- 14 -
account of the sharp rise of unemployment in 1981-83, the theory fails due to
wrong timing: the U.S.-budget deficit began its spectacular rise in 1982, a
year when the business cycle trough had already been reached in West
Germany. Also, real interest rates - how ever measured - had made a great
upward leap before, from around 3 % in 1978-79 to about 4 1/2-6 % in 1982,
depending on which deflator is used and to what extent the movements of
price inflation are smoothed by intertemporal averaging . It is very likely
that, in these recession years, contractionary monetary and fiscal policies in
West Germany and most other countries (including since 1979 the U.S.)
14 played by far the major part in the story. Secondly, as to the persistence
of unemployment in the recovery period, only the early years 1983-85 show
the relevant configuration of macro variables (high US-budget and current
account deficits, high real interest rates and an 'overvalued' dollar).
However, with the exception of a brief dip of the business cycle in late 1984
and early 1985, these were not genuine depression years in West Germany: on
average, real GDP grew at slightly above 2 % p. a. , industrial production at 3
% p. a., gross fixed capital formation at 1.4 % p. a, with a notable difference
in growth rates between investment in durable equipment (4.8 % p. a. ) and
investment in buildings (-0.8 % p. a. ). Of course, this is no spectacular
growth and - by placing a capital cost burden on Europe - the American
policy mix may well have contributed to the slowness of the recovery at that
time. In this respect, the theory makes an important point. Even then, how-
ever, the very different investment balances of European countries - note the
early investment boom in Denmark, the UK and Sweden - suggest that home
made policy may still have played a major role. Thirdly, in the period after
the dollar's fall and the gradual decline of real interest rates , the growth
of investment, output and also employment accelerated markedly (especially in
1988/89), but unemployment - though somewhat diminishing - remained
1
3 For details, see Paque (1989c), p. 10, Table 3.
1
4 See also Jackman (1988), p. 1248.
Note that this period should be dated from mid-1985 until 1988, despite the
fact that the real interest rate, if measured by subtracting consumer price
inflation from the nominal interest rate, did not come down until 1987. The
sudden drop of consumer price inflation below zero in 1986 was certainly
regarded by economic agents as a transitory phenomenon since it was all too
obvious that the dramatic oil price decline would not continue at the pace it
did at that time.- 15 -
stubbornly high, with a still growing share of long-term unemployed and no
prospect of substantial improvement in the near future, even if the boom will
continue at its present pace. Just these last years' positive business cycle
experience, which Fitoussi, Phelps (1988) take as indirect empirical support
for their theory , casts serious doubt on whether the transatlantic crowding -
out hypothesis is really targeted at explaining the two main features of the
current West German (and also European) malaise, namely (i) persistent
unemployment even at the peak of a powerful boom, and (ii) an unsatisfactory
trend growth of employment over the last fifteen years which - quite
obviously - is not just a matter of poor cyclical performance in the early
eighties. Hence, the transatlantic crowding-out model may be a valid supply
side paradigm to explain the peculiar pattern of European business cycles in
the 1980's, but it is not a genuine theory of unemployment persistence and
the poor long-term record of employment growth.
4. Hysteresis
The failure of the (traditional) Keynesian paradigm to explain the European
unemployment record in the 1980's has led Blanchard, Summers (1986a, b,c;
1988) to formulate a theory of hysteresis which takes explicit account of the
asymmetry of this record. Briefly summarized, the theory states that, after
the long and severe recession of 1981-83, a dual labour market has gradually
developed with two kinds of workers: those who remained employed all
throughout or became re-employed after some brief jobless spell, and those
who - for whatever reason - remained unemployed. For the latter group, the
chances for re-employment have subsequently worsened for essentially two
reasons: (i) an effective devaluation of their human capital due to the lack
of job practice, demotivation and demoralization and the potential employers'
inclination to take the length of an unemployment spell as a negative indicator
for the expected productivity of a job applicant; and (ii) the wage setting
process where the interests of (employed) insiders are much better
represented than the interests of (unemployed) outsiders. Thereby, the
detrimental impact of the wage-setting process is not or at least not primarily
attributed to centralized wage bargaining between unions and employers'
1
6 Fitoussi, Phelps (1988), Preface, pp. VII-VIII.- 16 -
associations in (neo-)corporatist economies; it is rather booked on the account
of employers' rational inclination to pay efficiency wage premia which lead to a
17 wage level incompatible with full employment.
Does this theory stand up to the facts in the case of West Germany? Two
straight empirical consequences of a process of hysteresis are that, in the
course of cyclical recovery, (i) the share of long-term in total unemployment
rises and (ii) the average duration of a completed relative to an uncompleted
spell of unemployment declines (due to the adverse-selection effect of the
'good ones' leaving and the 'bad ones' remaining in the pool of the
unemployed). In fact, this is broadly what happened in West Germany: the
share in total unemployment of those who have been out of work for more
than one (two) year(s) rose from 13.0 (3.9) % in 1981 over 24.9 (7.2) % in
1983 up to 32.6 (16.5) % in 1988 (end of September respectively); in addition,
the average duration of a completed spell of unemployment relative to an
uncompleted one declined sharply, from 70 % in 1982 and still 59 % in 1985
18 down to 49 % in 1988. A similar process of hysteresis seems to have taken
place in the recovery years of the second half of the seventies, with the
share of long-term unemployment (uncompleted spell equal or above one year)
19
increasing from low levels of about 5 % in 1971-73 up to 14.5 % in 1979.
Hence hysteresis seems to be not a new phenomenon, but a general
characteristic of the two extended recovery periods after the slowdown of
trend employment growth some time in the mid-seventies.
See i. a. Summers (1988).
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Own calculations based on data of the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit. Note that
the expected duration of an uncompleted spell is higher than the time of
unemployment passed at the time of inquiry. In a stationary state, with
entries into and exits out of unemployment being equal, this expected
duration should be about double the duration of the uncompleted spell. As,
by 1988, the labour market came close to a stationary state in this sense,
the average duration of a completed spell was about one quarter of the
average expected spell duration for a person who was unemployed at the
end of September 1988.
19
As the method of computing long-term unemployment has been slightly
changed in 1983 (for details, see Paque 1989b, p. 32, footnote 30 and
Werner 1987a, pp. 41-42), the share given for 1971-73 is a (quite reliable)
estimate of the author; the share for 1979 is an ex-post recomputation by
the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit.- 17 -
As is well-known, the hysteresis theory has far-reaching macroeconomic
implications for the intertemporal pattern of wage inflation: whenever
unemployment becomes hysteretic, recession-induced wage moderation fades
away as soon as laid-off workers lose their market clout while they slide into
long-term unemployment. This has straightforward consequences for economet-
ric modelling: in traditional wage equations, the growth of the wage level
depends i. a. on the current unemployment rate as a proxy for the extent of
disequilibrium (i.e. excess supply) in the labour market. Implicit in this
specification is the assumption that the non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment (NAIRU) remains constant all throughout. The standard specifi-
cation implies that persistently high unemployment in fact leads to permanent
wage moderation. If the hysteresis theory is correct, the standard wage
equation is misspecified and must be replaced by a hysteretic wage equation
which includes some measure of the short-term deviation of the unemployment
rate from its long-term level, with this level gradually adjusting to changes
of the current rate.
By now, there have been quite a few macroeconometric studies of nominal
wage behaviour in the West German economy along these modified lines. In
general, they give quite unanimous support to the (hysteresis) view that
wage moderation is of a cyclical nature and thus fades away rather quickly -
after three to four years at the latest - in the process of economic recovery,
no matter how large and durable the remaining sediment labour surplus turns
20
out to be. Together with the macro statistics on long-term unemployment,
this points to an increasingly dualized labour market as postulated by the
hysteresis theory, both in the late seventies and the eighties.
Still then, the question remains which economic forces are responsible for the
hysteretic macro picture. Here lies the weak spot of hysteresis models as a
full-scale alternative to traditional NAIRU-theorizing. As mentioned above,
there are two candidates for an economic explanation of hysteresis: wage-
setting in an insider-/outsider framework and human capital devaluation. In
general, advocates of the hysteresis theory place much more emphasis on the
20
See i. a. Blanchard, Summers (1986a), Coe (1985, 1988) and Paque
(1989b,c).- 18 -
21 former than on the latter . Attractive as wage setting may in fact be in view
of the prominent role of collective bargaining in West Germany, it faces one
major difficulty: by itself, i. e. without any recourse to some kind of
outsiders' human capital devaluation, it can hardly be made compatible with
the observation of a declining wage gap. If, e.g., a major demand contraction
as in 1981-82 eventually pushed about 3-4 % of the labour force into
unemployment, and if - as .actually happened in the 1980's - wage policy
had hysteretic features, but nevertheless allowed profit margins to recover so
that any sensible macro wage gap measure indicates about a return to
pre-recession levels of real unit labour cost, then it is difficult to understand
economically, why the outsiders' unchanged human capital stock will not be
gradually reemployed. Clearly, the failure of the macro-version of the neo-
classical labour cost theory equally applies to a 'macro-version' of the
insider-outsider theory.
Simply adding some efficiency wage considerations does not make the case
more convincing as a little thought experiment may indicate: if, in the course
of a recession, one of two workers with identical human capital is laid off
while the other one remains employed so that, subsequently, the only
difference between them consists in the very fact of insider- versus
outsider-status, then it overstretches economic imagination to assume that,
after cyclical recovery and the melting away of any prior wage gap, a profit-
maximizing firm employing the insider would not recognize the outsider to
match the insider in terms of (potential) productivity and thus not profitably
reemploy him. Even more importantly, an efficiency-wage based insider-/
outsider-theory fails to contribute to the explanation of the most obvious and
striking international fact of labour markets in the 1980's, the difference in
performance between the United States and most EEC-countries, including
West Germany: while the United States managed to cut down its unemployment
rate from almost 9.5 % in 1983 to just about 5 % in 1988, West Germany
achieved only a much more modest reduction from 8 % in 1983 to 6.2 % in
1988; likewise, the US-employment growth rate in the recovery period
surpassed 2.6 % p. a. , the West German one was around 1 % p. a. As there is
no argument why efficiency wage premia should suddenly play a much more
21
See Blanchard, Summers (1986a) with strong reliance on the ideas of
Lindbeck, Snower (1986), and the contributions in Cross (1988) which
mostly focus on wage-setting.- 19 -
prominent role in West Germany than in the United States - if anything, the
higher mobility of the American work force speaks for the reverse to hold -,
efficiency wage models should not serve as major ingredients of an explanation
22
of the current West German malaise.
Hence one is left with human capital devaluation. Conceptually, two types of
human capital devaluation - may be distinguished: (i) an 'internal' devaluation
due to the lack of job practice, demotiyation and demoralization in the course
of an unemployment spell; and (ii) an 'external' devaluation due to a decline
of demand for certain kinds of labour (including crude physical force) which
is the indirect result of structural change in the markets for goods and
services. By its very nature, a hysteresis theory must focus on the first,
not on the second one which falls more into the realm of conventional NAIRU-
theorizing. Unfortunately, the first type is empirically very fuzzy since
subjective categories like morals, motivation or the 'rusting' of skills are
hardly quantifiable. The second type is somewhat easier to grasp: If
aggregate statistics reveal that long-term unemployment is concentrated
among those unemployed with negative structural characteristics like, e.g.,
lack of qualification, bad health, old age or location in declining regions,
then a good case can be made for external devaluation dominating the picture.
If, e.g., the share of long-term in total unemployment is ceteris paribus
much higher in, say, the declining coal mining area C than in the fast
growing modern service region S, then it would be awkward to ascribe this
fact not to the difference of local economic conditions, but to the endogenous
deterioration of human capital in C compared to S due to some local
differential in skill rusting, morals or motivation. Bluntly speaking, the
former coal miner in C does not remain long-term unemployed because he has
recently become a bad coal miner, but because (i) he is a coal miner at all or
(ii) no jobs in other sectors are on offer in region C. In case (i), his
specific skill is not demanded anymore; in case (ii), he finds no vacancy to
match. In either case, his human capital is devalued right from the start of
his unemployment spell, be it through skill rigidity or regional immobility. Of
course, this kind of structural imbalance will not be immediately recognized as
22
This does not mean that efficiency wage models are not an important
theoretical contribution to labour economics with a very broad range of
applicability (see Katz, 1986). It rather means that, for the particular
question at hand, their explanatory power is very limited.- 20 -
Table 4: Share of Long-term in Total Unemployment (in %) in Different
Samples of Unemployed Persons (September 1988)*
Unemployed persons
a) aged below 55 22.5
aged equal or above 55 57.1
b) with unimpaired health 28.7
with impaired health _ A6.2
c) with completed vocational education/training 28.2
without completed vocational education/training 37.2
d) in state with lowest share (1) 24.4
in state with highest share (2) 37.9
e) in labour district with lowest share (3) 15.6
in labour district with highest share (4) 45.5
All unemployed 32.6
* long term unemployment defined as an uncompleted spell of
unemployment of at least 1 year at the end of September 1988.
(1) Southern Bavaria; (2) Northrhine-Westfalia; (3) Nagold; (4) Essen
Source: Own calculations from Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Arbeitsstatistik
such by the collective bargaining parties in the course of a recession so that
wage moderation will prevail for a while. However, with cyclical recovery
gaining ground, the structural core of the labour market disequilibrium will
become visible to unions and employers' associations so that a hysteretic
macro pattern of wage inflation emerges.
A casual glance over some aggregate statistics shows that structural factors
like age, qualification, health, and region play an important part in West
German long-term unemployment. As Table 4 indicates, the share of long-term
in total unemployment is higher than the average of 32.6 % in all subsamples
of unemployed which are characterized by some structural handicap. Thereby,
age (above 55 years), poor health and the regional factor seem to be the most
powerful determinants of long unemployment spells. When cross-classifications
of structural factors are considered, the picture is even more revealing: in
September 1987, 74. 1 % of all long-term unemployed (with an uncompleted
spell over one year) were either aged above 55 and/or had an impaired health
and/or no vocational qualification; the corresponding share of short-term- 21 -
unemployment of this group was 57.7 %. If the large group of unemployed
without vocational qualification is excluded - it alone comprises about 50 % of
all unemployed -, these shares drop to 42.2 % and 21.6 % respectively, i. e.
more than 40 % of all long-term unemployed are either quite old for a
successful job search or in an economically relevant sense 'disabled'. In
addition, econometric evidence for West Germany indicates that the power of
negative structural characteristics as determinants of long-term unemployment
has increased in recent years. With highly disaggregated data on long-term
unemployment for the time 1975-87, Paque (1989c) shows that most of the rise
of the share of long-term in total employment during the two recovery periods
1975-79 and 1983-87 is due to the (growing) economic importance of structural
handicaps in the labour market, with age (above 55 years) and region
(location in high unemployment labour district) having gained most. Thus, in
the periods 1975-79 and 1983-87, the share of long-term unemployment among
23 structurally non-handicapped unemployed persons remained virtually
constant (at around 5-6 % in 1975-79 and 12-13 % in 1983-87); at the same
time, however, the respective share among structurally handicapped persons
increased quite dramatically (e.g. for the group with age above 55 years from
about 12 to 22 % in 1975-79 and from about 21 to 38 % in 1983-87).
On the whole, these results support the view that external rather than
internal forces are mostly responsible for human capital devaluation and thus
for labour market dualization in West Germany. To explain why age, bad
health, lack of qualification and location in a depressed area have reduced the
long-term chances for reemployment, one does not need any recourse to an
implausibly powerful process of dequalification and demotivation during a
jobless spell. Rather, it is sufficient to assume that, given the high level of
dismissal protection West German labour law and collective bargaining
24 agreements grant to any worker under normal business cycle conditions , the
23
E.g. an unemployed person living in Baden-Wurttemberg or Southern
Bavaria with age below 55, good health and completed vocational
education/training.
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For a complete summary of dismissal protection in West Germany, see
Soltwedel (1980), pp. 185 ff. In general, West German labour law requires
that any dismissal must be 'socially justified', with by far the most
important case of justification being urgent business, requirements. Of
course, this condition is most likely to be met in times of recession. By a
contin. footnote- 22 -
cyclical downturns of 1974-75 and 1981-82 were taken by firms as a chance to
cut down their labour costs by laying off the least productive workers. Right
from the start as job seekers, those laid-off workers with some 'structural
handicap' (lack of qualification, impaired health and, above all, age) were at
a disadvantage since - given the quite rigid structure of collective
bargaining wages - there is no great chance for them to offer a permanent
compensatory wage cut for their particular handicap. Hence, in the course of
economic recovery, they were left untouched as a sediment of long-term
unemployment. In this light, the human capital devaluation usually precedes
the state of unemployment; it is only temporarily concealed by favourite
cyclical conditions and the constraints imposed by the labour law which
prevents a continuous equilibrium type adjustment of the wage and/or
25
employment structure to the forces of structural change. Note that the
increasing importance of regional factors for the explanation of long-term
unemployment is a direct reflection of the regional incidence of economy-wide
structural change: laid-off workers in declining regions remain long-term
unemployed either because their skills are too specifically linked to the
declining sectors or because not enough job alternatives in other sectors are
available in the particular region.
Summing up, it must be conceded that the hysteresis paradigm has made an
important contribution to theory by focusing on the dualization of the labour
market in the aftermath of severe recessions , an aspect which has been
unduely neglected by traditional NAIRU-theorizing. In doing so, however, the
hysteresis paradigm is caught in a dilemma: either it sticks to a genuine
macro framework - and thus fails to account for the lack of any newly
emerging wage gap in the eighties - or it looks for an explanation in terms of
human capital devaluation, but then ends up in the micro or structural domain
which still belongs to the family of NAIRU-theories. In our view, only the
second alternative is promising, at least in the case of West Germany.
contin. footnote
somewhat more liberal permission of fixed-term employment labour contracts,
the 1985 Employment Promotion Law ('Beschaftigungsforderungsgesetz') led
to some de-facto loosening of dismissal protection in recent years. We shall
discuss the economic effects of this legal change in part IV of this paper.
2
5 On this matter in detail, see Soltwedel (1988), pp. 190-201.- 23 -
5. Structural Rigidities
Clearly, a structural explanation of West German unemployment is limited in
one important dimension: by its very nature, it cannot account for the
sudden bursts of unemployment in the mid-seventies and early eighties which
must no doubt be attributed to cyclical forces. It can only deliver a set of
microeconomic reasons why irresistible long-term forces loom behind these
short-term bursts, and why after the bursts, a core of long-term
unemployment remained even in the course of a pronounced recovery. In this
respect, both the sectoral and the regional components of structural change
are relevant.
As to sectors, we must go back to the empirical argument in Section 2 that,
since the mid-70s, the growth of the wage gap has predominantly been a
structural phenomenon, with manufacturing - and not the modern service
sector - bearing the main share of the burden. The question then arises: can
a 'structural' wage gap explain aggregate unemployment? After all, the net
loss of about two million jobs in the recessions 1974-75 and 1981-83 was almost
exclusively due to the shrinkage of industrial - above all manufacturing -
employment while the moderate employment gains in the recovery periods
1976-80 and 1983-88 were mostly - though not exclusively - made in service
sector employment. A tentative answer to the question lies in a comparison
of the West German case with a country which experienced a rapid structural
change between sectors without persistent unemployment, the United States.
Between 1973 and 1987, American manufacturing employment (excl. self-
employed) stagnated, but private service sector employment grew at an annual
rate of 3.3 % which amounts to a net gain of about 22. 3 million service sector
jobs, with the growth proceeding at a fairly constant rate all throughout
cyclical booms and recessions; in the same period, West German service sector
employment (also excl. self-employed) grew by just 0.9 % p. a. , i.e. by about
27
800,000 jobs in the course of 14 years. The American employment success
story had its counterpart in terms of a marked increase of intersectoral wage
2
6 See Glyn, Rowthorn (1988), pp. 146 and Part II of this paper.
27
Note that the sectoral classification schemes are somewhat different in the
U. S. and West Germany. However, this does not lead to any serious
distortion of the empirical picture. See Hoffmann (1988) for details.- 24 -
dispersion between manufacturing and services which also finds no parallel in
West Germany where the dispersion remained roughly constant. Apparently,
intersectoral wage flexibility allowed a rapid expansion of employment in the
United States while intersectoral rigidity did not in West Germany. As a
consequence of the fast service sector expansion, the economy-wide labour
productivity growth slowed down much more dramatically in the American than
28 in the West German service sector. Also, a good part of the exceptionally
bad overall productivity growth of the US-economy in the last two decades
and the disproportionally large increase of low-wage employment may be
29 explained by this rapid structural change.
With the West German manufacturing sector bound to shrink due to a high
wage gap and, on top of it, two sharp recessions, the private service sector
was due to take over the labour load. It did to a modest extent, with a
growth rate of employment (excl. self-employed) of about 1.9 % p. a. in
1976-80 and 1.6 % p. a. in 1983-88. This was not sufficient to cut back
unemployment as labour force growth speeded up due to a rising participation
ratio and - most recently - a rising influx of immigrants from East Germany
and Eastern Europe. Hence, at a given trend growth of labour productivity
and at a persistent structural wage gap in manufacturing, a return to full
employment could only happen in two different ways: either the wage level in
the service sector was reduced relative to manufacturing so that low
productivity laid-off workers could find a service job, or the wage level was
reduced altogether so that - at a given relative wage distortion between man-
ufacturing and services - both sectors could expand. Thus, in the seventies
and eighties West Germany had and still has two alternatives: either it
imitates the United States by allowing some more intersectoral wage flexibility
to give service sector employment an additional boost above its trend
growth, or it imitates its own past in the early sixties when the relatively low
wage level allowed structural change to proceed in a state of over-
28
For a detailed comparison of intersectoral wage flexibility and productiv-
ity growth in the U.S. and West Germany, see Burda, Sachs (1987), pp.
27-31.
29
See Bluestone, Harrison (1988), Freeman (1988), and The Economist of
Nov. 12, 1988, p. 86-87 "America's Shrinking Middle".- 25 -
Table 5: Average Annual Unemployment Rates in West German State Labour
Offices (in %)




















































Source: Own calculations from Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Arbeitsstatistik
employment. Note that both ways amount to a reduction of labour costs at
least somewhere in the economy to compensate for the employment effect of
the wage gap in manufacturing. Hence, if we are ready to assign explanatory
power to the vast difference of the experiences of the two countries in
question - and it would be hard not to do so - then a structural wage gap
combined with a fairly rigid wage structure between sectors may well explain
31 at least part of the persistent unemployment in West Germany.
As to regions, there is no doubt that the emerging labour surplus has been
distributed quite unevenly in the last fifteen years (see Table 5): by 1988, a
clearcut north-/south divide has taken shape, with the three northern regions
being hit much harder by unemployment than the southern ones. This
corresponds to the sectoral incidence of job creation: the regions with a
concentration of modern service and industrial sectors (above all
Baden-Wurttemberg, Hesse and Southern Bavaria) took the lead in the fight
against unemployment, while the main steel-, coalmining- and/or shipbuilding
regions (Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Northrhine Westfalia and - to
3
0 See Paqu6 (1988).
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In essence, we share this conclusion with Burda, Sachs (1987); however,






































Table 6: Average Annual Employment Growth Rates in West German State












Source: Own calculations from Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Arbeitsstatistik
(employment statistics of social security administration).
some extent - Rhineland Palatine/Saar) fell behind. Thereby, all northern
regions faced a further rise of their unemployment rates in the recovery
period 1983-88, while all southern regions managed to achieve a reduction.
Note that the straight north/south pattern took shape only gradually in the
last fifteen years. It is not yet quite discernible for 1973 and 1976 when the
interregional variation of unemployment rates was still quite small, with only
one southern state (Baden-Wurttemberg) showing a clearly better unemploy-
ment record than the West German average.
Table 6 indicates that the emergence of the present interregional pattern of
unemployment is in fact mostly due to differences in employment growth, i. e.
of labour demand, not supply: since the mid-seventies, most southern regions
persistently outpaced the northern ones in employment growth. The sole
exception is the region Rhineland -Palatine /Saar which, after all, hosts the
ailing Saar steel and coalmining industries. Note also that the interregional
growth differential has increased over time, with the dispersion being more
pronounced in the eighties than in the seventies.
The picture conveyed by Tables 5 and 6 somewhat contradicts the received
wisdom in the modern macroeconomic literature that regional imbalances are no
important elements of the unemployment malaise in West Germany (and Europe- 27 -
32 in general). The standard evidence is based on the so-called indices of
mismatch between unemployment and vacancies. Regional balance is assumed to
prevail whenever it is impossible to increase the rate of job hiring s and thus
to reduce unemployment through interregional movements of the unemployed.
The rationale behind this definition has some intuitive appeal: only to the
extent that the particular (mal-)distribution of unemployed and vacancies con-
tributes to overall employment, may it make sense to speak of unemployment
caused by an existing regional imbalance. On the grounds of this philosophy,
some measures of mismatch are calculated for 142 West German local labour
offices. In general, they indicate that from 1973 to the mid-eighties, there
33
was no more than a minor increase of regional mismatch.
This type of evidence hides an important qualitative issue. If one explicitly
distinguishes two types of regional balance, namely the balance between
selected large units of the whole (e.g., state labour offices) and the balance
within these units (between local labour offices), a much more differentiated
picture emerges: between the states, there has been a substantial increase of
34 regional imbalance, but just the reverse holds within states. The
consequence is apparent: there has been a significant qualitative shift of
regional unemployment from a 'spot issue' to a 'cluster issue'. In the early
seventies, regional imbalance was above all a problem of many small backward
areas more or less evenly scattered all over the country while, by the mid-
eighties, it has become a problem of many backward areas clustered in those
regions where the declining industries like coalmining, steel and shipbuilding
tend to be concentrated. Naturally, the same measured 'absolute amount' of
overall mismatch constitutes a much more severe obstacle to any macroeconomic
fight against unemployment when it is regionally clustered since spill-over
effects of regional growth centers cannot be relied upon to accelerate
economic development in backward areas. In fact, the main structural issue
which has gradually moved into the foreground of the economic policy debate
during the seventies and eighties in West Germany is not regional imbalance
32
For this opinion, see, i. a., Franz (1987), Franz, Konig (1986), Jackman,
Roper (1987), Layard, Nickell, Jackman (1985).
For theoretical details, see Jackman, Roper (1987), pp. 11-16. For a
methodological critique of the measures, see Paque (1989a), pp. 6-20.
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For the numerical evidence, see Paqu6 (1989a, b).- 28 -
itself, but rather the broad north/south divide which has completely pushed
aside the questions of how to support small backward areas, above all those
close to the 'inner-German border'.
Viewed as a whole, the evidence on the composition of long-term
unemployment, on the sectoral employment growth pattern and on regional
imbalances do point to a significant and still increasing structural dimension
of the West German unemployment malaise. If one further recognizes the fact
36 that official estimates now put the number of vacancies around 550000, a
level not reached since the early seventies at a time of extreme labour
shortage, there remains not much doubt that the core of the problem as it
appears today is structural or micro, not macro.
6. Summary of Diagnosis
Our main diagnostic points from the preceding analysis may be summarized as
follows:
a. The bulk of West German unemployment arose in the course of the two
severe macroeconomic stabilization crises 1974-75 and 1981-83. At its new
dimension, the labour market disequilibrium subsequently took on
hysteretic macro features, i. e.
- nominal wage inflation resumed its normal path despite a persistently
high unemployment rate, and
- a dual labour market developed, with a growing share of long-term
unemployed.
b. The main reasons for the hysteretic macro picture lie in a combination of
microeconomic or structural factors:
For another type of evidence for the increase of regional disparities
based on intertemporal shifts of Beveridge-curves, see Paque (1989b, c).
In June 1989, the number of officially registered vacancies was on average
about 260000. Due to vast underreporting, the true number of vacancies
must be considered to be much higher. The Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt und
Berufsforschung, Niirnberg, estimates the true number to be around 550000
(see Handelsblatt of April 18, 1989, "Experten halten die Zahl von einer bis
1,5 Millionen offener Stellen fur unrealistisch").- 29 -
(i) In the West German economy with its extensive dismissal protection for
labour in normal times, there is likely to be a strong asymmetry
between lay-offs and reemployment: firms use sharp cyclical
downturns to purge their labour stock of the least productive
workers, but do not reemploy them as soon as a 'fresh' (and
prospectively more productive) labour becomes available in the market
as in fact happens when the labour force grows. Hence a recession
uncovers a human capital devaluation which has already taken place
on the job due to e.g. age, impaired health or, to a lower extent,
lack of qualification, but which is tolerated by firms under normal
cyclical conditions because dismissal protection impedes a more
continuous adjustment and regeneration of employment.
(ii) As the net loss of about two million jobs in the recessions 1974-75 and
1981-83 occurred in manufacturing where the pressure of labour costs
was particularly pronounced due to unfavourable terms-of-trade
effects, more jobs were to be created in the service sector to prevent
laid-off industrial workers from sliding into long-term unemployment.
This happened, but - compared to the US-economy - to a very modest
degree mainly because intersectoral wage rigidity did not allow low
wage service sector employment to grow as it did in the United
States.
(iii) Measured properly, regional disparities in West Germany have grown
since the mid-seventies so that, to an increasing extent, long-term
unemployment is not only the outcome of a genuine devaluation of
human capital, but also of a lack of labour demand in regions with a
particularly bad structural mix of economic activity.
c. For diagnostic purposes, the standard explanation of hysteresis - too high
a wage level in an insider-outsider framework and human capital
devaluation in the course of an unemployment spell - are only of secondary
importance since
- estimates of aggregate wage gaps do not support the view that the
current wage level is much too high, and
- the incidence of long-term unemployment is so strongly related to
identifiable structural characteristics that it would be far-fetched to
place much explanatory weight on processes of endogenous
dequalification or demotivation.- 30 -
IV. Employment Policy Options
For analytical purposes, we shall broadly distinguish five categories of policy
responses to the current (un-)employment malaise in West Germany which are
worth discussing in the light of our prior analysis:
(1) Wage differentiation,
(2) active labour market policies,
(3) liberalization of labour market regulations,
(4) supply side measures to promote economic growth, and
(5) expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policies.
Of course, these are not mutually exclusive policy options, but rather analyt-
ically separate tool boxes which may be (and partly have been) used simulta-
neously in actual practice.
1. Wage Differentiation
On economic grounds, the apparently large differences in value productivity
between labour of different age, health status and qualification call for more
wage differentiation. In the extreme - abstracting from actual institutional
constraints - , anybody with a structural handicap of these kinds could offer
his labour at a wage which corresponds to his marginal value productivity as
seen by any potential employer. As a consequence, the type of heterogeneity
in the labour force which is most relevant for reemployment prospects could
enter wage formation and thus open up additional submarkets for 'structurally
handicapped labour'. In essence, this comes down to removing all minimum
wage restrictions as they de-facto apply in West Germany's collective
bargaining system. Taking as a rough guide the American experience after
1981 when the (nominally) constant minimum wage was gradually eroded
through price inflation, one should expect low-wage service sector employment
to profit most from this policy.
There are at least three standard objections against this kind of proposal:
Firstly, on theoretical grounds, efficiency wage considerations may prevent
firms from taking advantage of the potential for (downward) differentiation of
wages since the consequence of having a two-tier wage system may worsen a
company's working climate and the motivation of the employed labour force.
This is probably why not only unions, but also employers' associations usually- 31 -
oppose the idea of wage differentiation, thereby stressing the cherished
principle of equal pay for equal work as a means to preserve industrial
37 peace. This objection is convincing as far as it goes: there can be no
guarantee that existing firms will in fact employ outsiders at lower wages. On
the other hand, new firms may be established which profitably employ the
surplus labour. This is essentially what happened in the United States and
there are no reasons why it could not happen in West Germany as well. At
any rate, there is no way of ascertaining the effectiveness of the proposed
reform without trying it.
Secondly, most critics argue that such a reform, if successful, would come
down to a virtual dismantling of the West German collective bargaining
system. There is an element of truth in this objection since any explicit wage
discrimination between in- and outsiders runs counter to the spirit of
collectivized wage-setting. However, a reform along these lines may have
quite pragmatic features which could preserve the essentials of the present
system: wage discrimination may be explicitly restricted to new hires of
long-term unemployed and limited in time until - hopefully - labour market
conditions have fundamentally changed due to the expected massive demo-
graphic shifts in the late 1990s; just like any other employment contract, they
may be subject to regular collective bargaining agreements so that, after all,
unions and employers' associations could keep control over them.
Thirdly, given the current systems of unemployment insurance in West
Germany, any drastic wage cut for labour market fringe groups could lead
into what may be called a reservation wage trap. Right now, unemployment
support of 63 % of the last net wage (for unemployed with at least one child:
68 %) is paid on an insurance basis for a limited period, mostly 12-24 months,
depending i. a. on age; thereafter means tested unemployment aid of 56 % (58
% respectively) is paid indefinitely out of taxpayers' money. Clearly, a job
offer of, say, 50 % of the unemployed person's last net wage means a net
income loss. If there is no legal chance of cutting unemployment aid to force
the unemployed person into the new job, then a reservation wage trap
emerges. Right now, West German law gives an unemployed person the right
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of July 31, 1989, "Keine untertarifliche
Bezahlung fur vormals Arbeitslose - Arbeitgeber und Gewerkschaften lehnen
Tarifoffnung einhellig ab".- 32 -
to decline a job offer without losing his claim to aid, if, i. a. , the job would
significantly worsen his long-term chances to return to the kind of work he
38 did before or to a job of comparable professional status. It is evident that,
for many low-wage offers - at least to persons of age or bad health - this
condition will be met. Of course, adjusting the law so as to avoid the trap is
a matter of social value judgement, not economics: if one prefers to get the
long-term unemployed back to work even at the price of some painful
individual adjustment, then some tougher rules may be justified; if one
regards this sort of social pressure as unacceptable, no change would be
required. Again, pragmatic compromises could be struck by offering some
kind of gradually phasing-out unemployment aid for the time after a low-wage
job has been accepted. However, even without avoiding the trap, a job
market purged of minimum wage restrictions for structurally handicapped
persons would clarify the costs of a social system which anchors the level of
unemployment aid in historical, not actual human capital valuation.
In West Germany, the most widely discussed type of structural wage differen-
tiation is the one between regions. Economically, it would have above all the
task of compensating inherent differences in local conditions which, in the
eyes of a potential investor, make the expected rvalue productivity - though
mostly not the expected physical productivity - of the same kind of work
differ between regions. In an idealized setting, the perfectly mobile factor
capital moves to the place where the profitability of investment, is highest due
to a whole bunch of diverse local conditions, including labour costs and real
estate prices. If labour is an essentially immobile factor - a quite realistic
assumption for West Germany, at least between her larger regional units - ,
wages have an important function for the allocation of capital in space, just
like real estate prices: when wages are kept the same everywhere, capital
moves ceteris paribus to the regions with the highest value productivity of
labour, with the load of price adjustment being exclusively on real estate;
thus regions with a locational disadvantage forego investment and become
depressed areas with low real estate prices, but high unemployment.
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See § 103 Arbeitsforderungsgesetz (AFG) and § 2 Zumutbarkeits -
Anordnung.- 33 -
There is a somewhat curious economic debate about the extent and recent
39 development of interregional wage differentiation in West Germany. Thereby,
too much attention has been directed to differentials in actual earnings which
are heavily influenced by regional differences in the sectoral and industrial
structure of economic activity. Typically, urbanized regions with a high
concentration of modern industries and services have a particularly high value
productivity and wage level per worker. However, for locational investment
decisions, this information is only of minor interest. What is relevant instead
are comparative wage levels in the one particular sector of economic activity
where investment will take place. Hence, only a sector-by-sector comparison -
preferably on a very low level of aggregation - has any substantial bearing
on the issue at hand. This kind of structural analysis shows that both the
minimum wages as fixed by collective bargaining for different labour
categories and the respective effective wages as actually paid have a very low
spread across regions, with a coefficient of variation mostly around 5 %. Still
more importantly, the regional pattern is quite uniform and stable over time,
with the urbanized states Hamburg, Northrhine-Westfalia, Hesse, and Baden-
Wurttemberg in the lead, and the rural states - especially Bavaria - somewhat
40 behind. Quite obviously, this structure does not adequately reflect the
changes of labour market and general economic conditions like the emerging
north-south devide in West Germany which can be nicely read off the
41 statistics on real estate prices.
Given the usually high share of labour in total costs of an industrial or
service sector company, a moderate, but significant and persistent wage
differential of, say, 20-30 % between two regions like booming Wurttemberg
and depressed Ostfriesland could probably initiate a quite dramatic regional
diversion of investment, just like a once-foi—all currency devaluation in real
terms normally leads into an investment boom. West German unions oppose this
qo
See i.a. Bell, Freeman (1985), Gundlach (1986), Roller (1987), Hardes
(1988), Soltwedel (1988), and Bellmann, Buttler (1989).
40
Own calculations on basis of data of the Statistisches Bundesamt. Thanks
are due to C. -F. Laaser for some guidance through the data. See also
Soltwedel (1988), pp. 178-180.
41
See Deutsche Bundesbank (1989), p. 39 where it is shown that, in 1988,
the real estate price level was on average about 40 % higher in cities of
southern than of northern Germany.- 34 -
policy on basis of the notion of (nominally) equal living conditions all over
West Germany. In view of the wide differences between real estate prices and
rents across regions, this notion looks increasingly antiquated; after all, a
car worker in depressed Bremen may be better off in real terms than a car
worker in booming Stuttgart simply because housing is so much cheaper in
depressed than in booming areas. Hence, even on the fuzzy grounds of
42 'interregional fairness', a strong case for wage differentiation can be made.
2. Active Labour Market Policies
Theoretically, the employment effects of wage differentiation can also be
achieved by manipulating the relevant unit labour costs through appropriate
labour market policies. Within the standard arsenal of labour market policy
43 instruments which are all commonly applied in West Germany, the most
important ones at present are wage subsidies and qualification measures.
According to the West German 'labour promotion act' (Arbeitsforderungs-
gesetz) any firm employing an elderly long-term jobless person (age above 50)
may receive wage subsidies amounting to 50 % in the first down to 30 % in the
third year of a new (unlimited-term) employment contract. In addition, the
West German labour ministry recently announced a more broadly based
program to support the reintegration of all types of long-term unemployed by
granting wage subsidies of up to 80 % over one year for employment contracts
44 of unlimited duration; for this purpose an additional 1.5 billion DM will be
supplied by the West German government. Although these provisions and
programs look generous in scope and well-targeted, their beneficial effects
42
In principle, wage differentiation of any kind may also be achieved
through an across-the-board wage moderation, so that enough scope is left
for wage drift to give market forces a sufficient say. However, in view of
the great potential for social conflict which an 'uncontrolled' rise of wage
drift may have - think of the West German experience of the late sixties
when drift was followed by a dramatic rise of contract wages (see Swenson,
1989, pp. 72-84) -, an 'official' differentiation of contract wages should be
preferable, at least in the present West German institutional environment.
43
See Werner (1987b) for a summary.
44
See i. a. Wirtschaftswoche of June 9, 1989, "Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit -
Neuer Anlauf".- 35 -
may be hampered by the - unavoidably - temporary nature of subsidization:
for a firm, a temporary cut of labour costs at the early stage of a new
contract may not outweigh the long-term disadvantage of being stuck with a
low-productivity worker, at least as long as there are ample superior
alternatives in the market due to imigration-led growth of the labour force.
After all, the generous provisions for subsidizing the employment of elderly
persons did not noticebly slow down the emergence of a dual labour market.
In fact, only open-ended subsidies could fully copy a wage differentiation,
but they can hardly be recommended on economic efficieny grounds since they
involve a permanent socialization of employment costs.
As to qualification measures, there has been quite a boom in recent years:
the amount spent by the West German labour administration on supporting
vocational training doubled in the period 1983-88, from 5.4 to 10.7 billion
45 DM. To smooth structural adjustment by facilitating occupational; sectoral
and also regional mobility as a partial substitute for wage differentiation, this
makes good economic sence, although the actual returns to this kind of public
investment are not well-known. However, as an initiative targeted at
long-term unemployment, it may simply miss the core of the problem. Most
qualification measures are naturally not training per se, but some sort of
retraining. Hence, the about 55 % of all long-term unemployed who have no
qualification in the first place, do hardly profit from the additional options.
To a large extent, this conclusion also applies to the other major fringe
groups of long-term unemployment: obviously, the main structural handicap of
older or chronically ill persons is not a wrong qualification, but age or bad
health. Hence, after all, labour market policies may not figure as more than
mere supplementary measures which alleviate the problem a little bit, but are
no significant step towards its solution.
4
5 See Lampert (1989), p. 187.
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With a view to Sweden, some labour market observers make a plea for a
drastic extension of active labour market policies in West Germany. They
tend to overlook that the extraordinary Swedish success story of the 1980s
was made possible above all by the hefty devaluation of the Swedish
currency in 1981/82, a kind of beggar-thy-neighbour policy which cut the
country off the train of world-wide recession and - with union consent -
allowed the real wage level in the large Swedish traded-goods sector to fall
by more than 10 %. The immediate consequence was an early export-led
growth push combined with a boom of investment. Without this kind of
contin. footnote- 36 -
3. Liberalization of Labour Market Regulations
By international standards, the West German labour markets are heavily
regulated, with the complex framework of dismissal protection being the main
47 legal constraint. By passing the 'Employment Promotion Law' (Beschafti-
gungsforderungsgesetz (BeschFG)) in 1985, the West German legislator made
a first move towards liberalization; i. a., the period for which fixed-term
contracts are generally permitted was extended from 6 to 18 month (and in
special cases to 24 month). Thus private firms were given the chance to
circumvent at least the cost of long-term dismissal protection when hiring new
workers. The law was originally intended to expire in 1990, but is now due to
apply for another five-year term.
By the time of its passing, the law was the object of a fierce debate in the
public, with the frontline running along the familiar political union/social
democratic versus liberal/conservative boundaries. By now, a fairly detailed
statistical stocktaking by the Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin (Buchtemann
1989), shows that, broadly speaking, the law has been a success, albeit by
no means a spectacular one. In the two-year sample period May 1985 to April
1987, about 850000 employment contracts, i. e. about 9 % of all new employment
contracts in the private sector, were made on a fixed-term basis according to
the BeschFG. Only about 30 % of these contracts would have been prohibited
with certainty under the prior case law jurisdiction on fixed-term contracts,
but firms apparently preferred the clearcut rules of the BeschFG over
unpredictable court decisions. Thereby, 56 % of all employees first hired on a
fixed-term contract were later taken over on a permanent basis. Hence, to a
large extent, firms used an introductory fixed-term as a prolonged trial
period to check the productivity of the newly hired work force; in addition,
contin. footnote
fortuituous macroeconomic move which has always been out of reach for
EMS-bound West Germany, Sweden's labour market record of the eighties
would certainly look much less impressive, maybe like her fairly mean
record in the seventies when only a disproportionate increase of public
sector employment prevented unemployment to rise to the levels of other
countries. For details on Swedish labour market policies, see Werner
(1987b) and Schmid (1989). For a general evaluation of the Swedish model,
see Lundberg (1985).
47
See Emerson (1988) who reports employers' relative evaluations of different
regulatory systems of labour markets in EEC-countries.- 37 -
firms regarded fixed-term employment as a useful buffer stock for times of
cyclical downturns. Although the net employment effect of the BeschFG is
naturally very difficult to calculate, a tentative estimate in the range of
170000 new hires in two years, with about 90000 more permanent jobs looks
quite reasonable
All in all, the BeschFG has added a significant element of flexibility to West
German labour market regulations. Still then, the core of the dismissal
protection laws has been left untouched; as it most forcefully applies to those
labour market fringe groups which are hit hardest by long-term unemploy-
ment, they figure as a persistent impediment to employment growth, at least
as long as a compensatory wage differentiation is not feasible.
4. Supply Side Measures to Promote Economic Growth
All economic policies which increase the (price) elasticity of aggregate supply
will in the long run help to alleviate the unemployment problem through an
acceleration of economic growth. In the West German economy, there are no
doubt plenty of reasonable policy options in the supply side realm, and the
present government has so far taken only very minor and timid steps in this
direction. In particular,
- a more daring income tax reform aimed at lowering marginal tax rates above
all in the middle income ranges may help to remove constraints on that part
of the labour supply (mostly consisting of skilled workers) which is in high
demand;
- a thorough cut of subsidies to ailing industries (i.e. coal mining) and
agriculture would allow to reap the productivity fruits of a speeded-up
structural change;
- a deregulation of some heavily regulated service sectors such as
communications, transport, and insurance would initiate a productivity push
4
8 See Biichtemann (1989), Chapter IV.
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For a summary evaluation of economic policy in West Germany since the
change of government in 1982, see Hellwig, Neumann (1987).- 38 -
and, if this push were not anticipated by collective bargaining, a reduction
of unit labour costs and thus an upsurge of service sector employment.
Of course, these are all measures aimed at improvements in the long run; in
the short run, they may even require painful adjustments. Nevertheless, they
are clearly warranted if the full output and employment growth potential of
the West German economy is to be tapped in the future.
5. Expansionary Monetary and/or Fiscal Policies
As to monetary demand policy, it is hard to see what it should do in the,
present boom period other than passively complementing any prospective
expansion of aggregate supply. Clearly, with high capacity utilization as it
prevails, any deliberate monetary expansion to increase employment would lead
right into inflationary bottlenecks, just as it did in the cyclical overheating at
the end of the seventies when the West German economy took over the role of
an international demand locomotive. At that time, the unemployment rate could
be cut down by just one percentage point in a two-year expansion which
pushed up the inflation rate from 2.8 % in 1978 to almost 6 % in 1980, thus
providing the rationale for the then following sharp contractionary monetary
measures with all their far-reaching consequences.
As to fiscal demand policy, things look hardly different. Whatever the
long-term merits of income tax cuts may be as a supply side measure, they
are hardly needed to support an ongoing boom; if they had an expansionary
effect, it is now likely to foster price inflation, not output and employment
See Soltwedel et al. (1986) for an appraisal of the potential for deregu-
lation in the West German economy.
Even at the peak of a boom, expansionary policies may still be considered
if the policy maker is ready to introduce price controls as an emergency
measure against inflation. Some prominent Keynesian economists (e.g.
Blinder, 1988) in fact argue that the allocative damage done by price
controls should be outweighed by the macroeconomic gains from expansion.
At any rate, we do not share this view as we think that the dismal
historical record of repressed inflations speaks for itself.- 39 -
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growth. The same holds a fortiori for an increase in public spending, even
if it is on infrastructure investment. There may be arguments for this kind of
public investment to remove bottlenecks on the supply side, although even
these arguments are weak for a country like West Germany with its very good
infrastructure; however, it looks misplaced and ill-timed as a deliberate
expansionary demand policy.
To summarize, only long-term structural (or micro) policies can now help to
alleviate the West German unemployment problem. To be sure, nothing miracu-.
lous should be expected from any move to more structural differentiation and
flexibility as it is advocated here. Any such move will only help to speed up
the reintegration of those unemployed who still have some realistic chance of
finding a job. Needless to emphazise that all proposals to restrain the labour
supply, as they are very popular among union officials in West Germany, are
obviously no adequate economic solution: apart from the many structural
tensions they create by reducing the supply of skilled labour, they amount to
a simple rationing device which does not create additional jobs, but rather -
at best - redistributes a given labour volume. This is true for early
retirement schemes, but even more so for a flat shortening of the work week.
After all, employment policy should aim at increasing labour demand, not at
artificially trimming labour supply.
52
The income tax cut at the beginning of 1990 will per se have some expan-
sionary effects. However, the impact is likely to be counterbalanced or even
overcompensated by the slightly contractionary effects of the monetary
measures taken by the German Bundesbank. See Institut fur Weltwirtschaft
(1989), pp. 22-26.- 40 -
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